I’ve read a million Closers Are Misused articles over the past few years and written a few of my own. I’ll try to let that topic mellow for a while, but I need to address one question before I let it go…
With many front-offices embracing other sabrmetric values, why hasn’t the strategic transition from “save-situation” closer to “high-leverage-situation” fireman begun? Is it the failure of the closer-by-committee? Is it because relievers really find it necessary to “know their role”? Is it because racking up the saves means hauling in the dollars? Is it because managers are afraid to rock the boat and fight the status quo? All four are ridiculous reasons. If you can think of any others, let me know.
Closer-by-committee bullpens fail because they’re set up to fail. Teams use a closer-by-committee when they don’t have one really good reliever to call their closer. If you allow any mediocre reliever to pitch important innings, the results aren’t pretty — just because you rotate three mediocre relievers into the important innings doesn’t mean you can expect better results. On a team with with Brad Lidge, Mariano Rivera, and Eric Gagne, are you telling me a closer-by-committee wouldn’t lead to a resounding success?
Well, you might get arguments against that plan from the “know-your-role” advocates. “How can Gagne expect to be lights-out if he doesn’t know the situation he’ll be pitching?” I have no doubt that baseball players like to feel as secure as possible. But how is the situation of “ninth-inning, up by 1, 2, or 3 runs” the most reliable of situations? There’s no regular appearance schedule for that. And there are plenty of other existing roles that are similar in reliability to the fireman role. The long reliever? He comes in when the starter gets booted early — that’s random. The LOOGY? Sure, he always faces lefties — except when the opposing manager pinch hits a righty — in either the 6th, 7th, or 8th inning. That’s all over the place. If a closer, who claims to thrive in reliable “high-pressure” save situations couldn’t also thrive in the role of fireman, who must perform in high-pressure situations late in the game against the opposing team’s most threatening attack, then he’s a liar in the first place.
Perhaps relievers are a smart breed and realize that closers who have large save totals also receive the large paychecks. For this, I blame front-offices. How many times do we see mediocre pitchers who have closing experience sign big contracts when there are much better pitchers available with fewer saves? How many times do we see a “risky” new closer turn into the next big thing, just by continuing to pitch well, albeit now in the closer role? Sure, some relievers can’t handle the pressure (or so people claim), but those pitchers wouldn’t be able to handle the intensity of the fireman role, either. Fans and GMs pay too much attention to the save stat. It will definitely take a few more teams devaluing the worth of a save on the open market before the fireman role gains in importance.
The manager, an extension of the front-office also deserves some blame in failing to take a risk. Using a closer is commonly accepted. If the strategy doesn’t work one night, the manager just needs to shrug and say “gee, what else could we have done — we just couldn’t get the game to our closer tonight.” If, however, a manger goes against the grain of major league strategy and uses a fireman, he has no “excuses” when it doesn’t work, and won’t have too many admirers even when the strategy does work. The proof comes from long-term success, and a long-term commitment takes guts.
So, if closers are going to complain about being removed from save situations and fans are going to complain about this crazy new usage pattern, what can be done? First, managers need to cowboy up and be the leaders they’re supposed to be — explain the strategy to the pitchers, deal with their egos, and handle the fans and media with savvy and confidence. Second, GMs need to offer contracts to relief pitchers based on pitching ability, not the ability to vulture saves. Doesn’t seem too difficult, actually.
In a game with players using designer steroids and organizations scouting six continents to gain an advantage, it’s mind-boggling to believe that teams aren’t optimizing their chances to win games because of a dumb statistic and a lack of desire to challenge the existing strategic norm.
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Sky is a baseball fan and racket sport afficianado living in upstate NY. His favorite color is orange and is just about ready to give up on his life-long dream to become the next Magnus ver Magnuson (World's Strongest Man). His favorite baseball teams are the Yankees and Red Sox, proving that there's hope in the Middle East.
April 7th, 2006 at 7:04 pm
Are you against closer-by-committee situations or against closers being held til the end of games?
Are you saying that many teams use a “closer” that isn’t the best reliever? While there are some cases of this (Wickman, MacDougal, Foulke, Nen a couple years ago), I would argue that most teams are solid in going with their best reliever as a “closer” (to your point though, they probably pay that person too much…)
I’m not sure I understand the “put him in earlier” scenario either. I mean, facing the 3-4-5 hitters in the 7th with a 1 run lead is dangerous, but you maintain the safety net of knowing that you have 9 outs to get back the runs if the other team scores. If the opponent can turn the batting order over (off the more mediocre pitcher that has to follow your “fireman”), you now have the same meaty hitters facing a lesser reliever with less outs remaing to make back a run (additionally, they’ll be playing specifically for 1 or 2 runs changing the dynamics of the game to some degree). I can’t disagree with the decision to throw a lesser reliever out there and “hope for the best” to try to get to that same situation.** (If you are arguing that a “hold” is often as valuable as a save, I would agree)
Also, I can’t believe you used the term “Cowboy Up” in this article. Did you accidentally mean to post this in 2004?
**I’ve probably misunderstood your argument, so please correct me.