skyking162

I have another guest post up about historical fielding, this time about the Yankees over at Steve Lombardi’s WasWatching blog. It’s a fun read, I think, as even a non-Yankee fan would recognize most of the names. Some of the more interesting tidbits include:

• Clete Boyer was a monster at third base, and deserved at least three Gold Glove awards.
• Don Mattingly and Bobby Richardson were extremely overrated at first base and second base, respectively. I’d love to hear some thoughts on why Mattingly doesn’t rate well.
• Wade Boggs did deserve his two Gold Gloves.
• Dave Winfield’s arm had to rival Sid Fynch’s to deserve any of his.
• Scott Brosius’ reputation as a godsend at third base in 1998 isn’t just legend talking. He was a black hole (in the good way).

If you have an interest in fielding numbers, either with today’s players or going back to 1956, it’s a lot easier than you think to find that information. This page has links to simple data tables on range, outfield throwing arms, catcher ratings, and first base scooping ability. I’m happy to answer any questions or point you in the right direction for any request.

Or, if you’re lazy, I’m happy to do the number-crunching for you. I’ll even right something up if you have a blog. Just send me an email at skyking162@gmail.com.

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Two blogs (Fragile Freddy and WasWatching) recently analyzed Derek Jeter’s contributions to the Yankees during his career. One concluded that New York would have missed the playoffs twice without Jeter and the other is going with six times.

I’m going to run the same study, not because I really want to know how critical Jeter has been to the Yankees’ success, but because I want to outline what I think is the best way carry out this analysis. Of course, I’m not going to attempt to measure all the intangibles and leadership Jeter has provided, because, well, those are valuable beyond measure. (It’s your choice whether to read the previous sentence with sarcasm or awe.)

I’m going to start with Baseball-Reference’s Batting Wins stat, which uses linear weights, park adjustments, and league adjustments. Best of all, it’s a stat that appears on every player page, listed second from the right in the Special Batting section. Derek Jeter’s 2007 batting wins were +2.0 (relative to average).

Batting wins includes stolen bases, but not general baserunning. Jeter’s typically regarded as a good baserunner, so I’ll give him another half a win per season.

Jeter’s prowess at shortstop is his main — and perhaps only — weakness as a player. I’m going to use STATS zone rating converted to runs for each season, linked here. In 2007, Jeter was 2.0 wins (20 runs) worse than the average shortstop.

Of course, Jeter does get some credit for being a shortstop and not a left fielder. Over 150 games in the field, shortstops get a half win bonus.

Finally, because we want to compare Jeter to replacement level, not average, we need to give him two wins per 650 plate appearances. In 2007, Jeter had 714 PAs, good for 2.2 more wins.

Overall, these estimates put Jeter at 3.2 wins above replacement level in 2007 (+2.0 batting, +.5 baserunning, +.5 position, -2.0 fielding, and +2.2 replacement.) For reference, four wins is borderline All-Star, and true MVP candidates are at least seven wins above replacement. If the Yankees had a replacement-level shortstop (zero wins) in 2007 instead of Jeter, they only would have finished “2.8″ wins ahead of the Tigers for the Wild Card, instead of six.

Below you’ll find the same data for each season Jeter has been the main Yankee shortstop. The “w/DJ” column is the actual number of games the Yankees finished ahead of the second place Wild Card finisher, while “w/oDJ” subtracts the number of wins Jeter provided. A negative number means the Yankees would have missed the playoffs. It looks like Jeter’s performance was critical to the Yankees’ playoff runs in 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005.

Year	Bat	Field	Pos	BRun	Repl	TOT	w/DJ	w/oDJ
1996	0.2	-1.3	0.5	0.5	2.0	1.9	4	2.1
1997	0.4	-0.2	0.6	0.5	2.3	3.6	12	8.4
1998	2.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.1	5.7	22	16.3
1999	4.9	0.0	0.5	0.5	2.3	8.2	4	-4.2
2000	2.5	-1.3	0.5	0.5	2.1	4.3	2.5	-1.8
2001	1.9	-1.8	0.5	0.5	2.1	3.2	13.5	10.3
2002	1.1	-1.6	0.5	0.5	2.2	2.8	10.5	7.7
2003	1.8	-1.4	0.4	0.5	1.7	3.0	6	3.0
2004	1.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	2.2	4.8	3	-1.8
2005	2.5	0.1	0.5	0.5	2.3	5.9	2	-3.9
2006	3.0	-0.5	0.5	0.5	2.2	5.7	10	4.3
2007	2.0	-2.0	0.5	0.5	2.2	3.2	6	2.8

Now, that’s not the end of the discussion, because there’s a definite possibility that the Yankees could have found a non-Jeter shortstop who was better than replacement level. I’m going to add three more pieces of information showing Jeter’s yearly salary, how many wins that money would have bought on the free agent market, and the advantage Jeter provided over spending that money on free agents.

According to TangoTiger’s research, free agent wins cost $4 million during the 2007 pre-season and are increasing by about 8% per season. So, as an estimate, free agent wins cost only $2.3 million in 1999, with the minimum salary being $200,000. The “w/o DJ” column now represents how many games ahead of the second place Wild Card team the Yankees would have finished by spending their money on a free agent alternative to Jeter.

Year	DJ Salary	DJ Wins	FA Wins	Advant	w/DJ	w/oDJ
1996	$130,000	1.9	0.0	+1.9	4	2.1
1997	$550,000	3.6	0.2	+3.4	12	8.6
1998	$750,000	5.7	0.3	+5.5	22	16.5
1999	$5 million	8.2	2.1	+6.2	4	-2.2
2000	$10 million	4.3	3.9	+0.4	2.5	2.1
2001	$13 million	3.2	4.7	-1.5	13.5	15.0
2002	$15 million	2.8	5.1	-2.3	10.5	12.8
2003	$16 million	3.0	5.0	-2.0	6	8.0
2004	$19 million	4.8	5.5	-0.6	3	3.6
2005	$20 million	5.9	5.3	+0.6	2	1.4
2006	$21 million	5.7	5.2	+0.5	10	9.5
2007	$22 million	3.2	4.9	-1.7	6	7.7

As you can see, 1999 is now the only season in which the Yankees would have finished out of the playoffs if they didn’t have Derek Jeter, although 2005 is close. Looking at the Advantage column, notice that New York got the most value out of Jeter from 1996 through 1999, the three years they could pay Jeter as little as they wanted and his first year of arbitration.

That’s not to say he got worse once his salary skyrocketed or that he’s not now a good player. It’s just that his value to the Yankees no longer compares to what they’re paying him, a fault of the Yankees, not Jeter. Since he signed the big contract in 2001, New York is a total of 7 wins worse with Jeter than if they had spent the same money at the average free agent rate.

Hat Tips…

… to Baseball-Reference.com, as usual
… to Sean Smith’s article pointing out the Batting Wins stat and replacement level adjustment
… to Baseball Almanac for the minimum salary info
… to Cot’s baseball contracts

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Or, why ARod is worth $35 million to the Yankees and nobody else.

Update: This is a re-write of an earlier article, using correct numbers.

Most major league organizations wouldn’t do well if they spent their entire payroll on free agents. Free agents are overpriced and tend to be on the wrong side of the aging curve. For the fun of it, let’s see how good a team like the Cardinals would be if they spent their entire $90 million budget on free agents:

$90 Million Isn’t Close To Average; $200 Million Is Better
A team of replacement level players making the league minimum would cost about $14 million dollars, leaving $76 million dollars for improving beyond the 48 wins of a replacement level team. Free agents cost about $4 million per marginal win these days, which would give our team 19 additional wins (76/4). Obviously, 67 total wins for a $90 million payroll just won’t cut it. I think we can agree that building your team through free agency is a poor plan for most teams. Free agents are just pieces to fill holes.

On the other hand, the Yankees’ $200 million payroll would be expected to buy 47 marginal wins [(200-14)/4] via free agency for a total of 95 wins per season. That’s playoff caliber, and is pretty much what they’ve done recently.

Now, the Yankees don’t spend every dollar on free agents, so why haven’t they done better than 95 wins? Well, one reason is that they spend their free agent dollars poorly. In 2007, all of these guys cost more than $4 million per win: Mike Mussina, Derek Jeter, Jason Giambi, Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, and Carl Pavano. Oh, and New York paid $9 million to players on other teams. Ouch. (For the record, ARod was 10 wins better than replacement, fully earning his contract. Considering the Yankees only paid two-thirds his salary, ARod was a steal.)

You Can’t Realistically Spend $200 Million On Free Agents
The other problem with buying 95 wins through free agency is that there’s a limited number of roster spots that contribute to the team. It’s nearly impossible to fill them all with adequately priced free agent talent. Assume that you need to sign nine position players, five starting pitchers, and three top relievers. That’s 17 players to pay with $186 million dollars, or $11 million each. For $11 million dollars, you’re expecting almost 3 wins per player. In 2007, there were about 100 position players at least 2.5 wins above replacement. However, just under half of those 100 have ever been eligible for free agency, meaning the Yankees would need to sign one out of every five top position player free agents (again, assuming they could properly identify them). The pitchers would be a similar ratio, I’m sure. I don’t see signing one out of every five players to reasonable contracts as a realistic plan. They need to do something else, too.

How The Yankees Should Handle It
Every off-season, the Yankees identify their holes and then either sign the best available free agents or make a deal for the best available high-priced trade-bait. The problem is that having the money to spend doesn’t mean that there are the right players to spend it on. Giving Barry Zito $150 million doesn’t make him perform like a $150 million player.

Therefore, like every other team, the Yankees need to develop some talent from within. They need to begin by building like a small-market team: accumulate draft picks, give bullpen roles and back-of-the-rotation spots to young pitchers, and consistently have guys like Robinson Cano available to step in when older players are wisely allowed to leave.

Only after the Yankeees spend their first $75 million intelligently and efficiently should the they do things other teams can’t afford. These other avenues are inefficient spending compared to the first $75 million, but if the Steinbrenners are willing to spend extra to win, this approach will get them the most wins, well above 95:

1. buy out their own players’ arbitration years — In return, those players will likely commit to a year or two of free agency at below-market value. This is an approach even smaller market teams can take, but the Yankees should do it with anybody of value — it’s cheaper than signing a free agent from another team.
2. international scouting and signings — I don’t mean large posting fees from Japan, as those guys really fall in the same category as MLB free agents. I’m talking about scouting Latin American countries and offering moderate contracts to young players with potential. Not everyone will work out, but throw enough spaghetti and… you know the rest.
3. trade cheap non-stars for more expensive talent — Melky Cabrera’s an issue for the Yankees. He’s slightly better than league-average and makes next-to-nothing, so obviously he’s a deal. But if the Yankees are aiming for 110 wins, that’s not good enough. They should trade him to another team in return for a better player earning a bit below the free-agent rate, Carl Crawford for example. Both players are bargains, but each fits better with the payroll of the other team. Robinson Cano, on the other hand, is as good as almost anyone the Yankees might look to sign, and thus is a definite keeper.
4. big-sticker draft picks — This approach is becoming known as the Detroit Tiger strategy (Andrew Miller and Rick Porcello are great examples). Some high school and college players fall in the draft because their demands for signing bonuses scare low-payroll teams. Most of them are still worth the price tag (expected return well under $4 million per win) and the Yankees should jump all over them. It’s like signing cheap free agents and the only downside is that you have to wait a few years to reap the benefits.
5. the best of the best free agents — The Yankees can’t sign an All-Star at every position, but they should sign future Hall Of Famers whenever possible, even though they cost $4 million per marginal win. You just can’t spend a full $200 million on small-market approaches. And for all the fiscal responsibility they’d be showing, the Steinbrenners wouldn’t be happy with a consistent 85-win, $125 million payroll. The last piece of the puzzle is shelling out $35 million per season to Arod and $25 million to Johan Santana. Whenever you can get one player who’s worth 8-10 wins on their own, you do it. Why? Because one BMW is better than five Jettas. If two-thirds of the team is built internally, there are a limited number of players you’ll be signing as free agents. In order to spend your entire free agent budget, you need to find players that are deserving of high salaries.

For the Yankees, the key is to build a foundation of reasonably priced players so that they’re only overspending on the best of the best, not on everybody. If the Yankees learn to develop stud young players to contribute alongside free agent stars, 110-win teams are not an unreasonable expectation. The first $75 million should create an 80-win team, and the additional $125 million tacks on 30 wins. George is right when he says his team should be better than 95 wins given a $200 million dollar payroll.

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